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Abstract 
This paper examines the commercialization propensities of individual inventors' patents. 
Exploiting a peculiarity of the US patent system, concerning patent renewal fees in order to 
obtain small or large entity status, we are able to distinguish patents that become part of a 
large corporation's patent portfolio. Using an extensive dataset of US patents, both for 
domestic and foreign individual inventors, we find that patent characteristics, size of research 
teams, prior experience and past corporate patenting activity are positively associated with 
increased likelihood of transferring patent rights to large corporations.   
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1.  Introduction 
 An “invention” is defined as the activity directed toward the discovery of new 
useful knowledge about products and processes, as described by Smookler (1957) and 
it is most frequently protected by the use of patents which grant exclusive rights to the 
owner of the invention for a limited time in exchange for full disclosure. Users of this 
type of Intellectual Property (IP) can be corporations, small businesses, nonprofit 
organizations and even more individual or independent inventors.
1
 
 Governments, mainly, and nonprofit organizations have developed programs 
to promote innovation by individuals, as their inventive performance is a perennial 
issue of policy interest. They provide consulting and evaluation services to inventors 
who want to transfer their inventions to the marketplace. Asterbo and Gerchak (2001), 
in a case study of the Canadian Innovation Centre and its Inventor's Assistance 
Program, found significant social benefits in consulting independent inventors on how 
they can best manage and/or commercialize their inventions. However, such programs 
are not always successful.  Spear (2006), for example, indicates that the National 
Research Development Corporation (NRDC) in the UK had low success rates in 
independent inventors’ patent commercialization.
2
 
 The objective of this paper is to examine commercialization and market 
potential of individual inventors’ patented inventions.  In particular, we are interested 
in how the patent's characteristics, the size of the research team, the prior patenting 
experience of the inventor, the inventor’s previous corporate ties, as well as some 
state macroeconomic factors are associated with commercialization of inventor owned 
                                                 
1
According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an independent inventor is 
defined as one whose patent at the time of grant is unassigned (i.e., patent rights are held by the 
inventor) or assigned to an individual:            
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby_in.html). 
2
 NRDC started in 1948 to help inventors in UK transform inventions into innovations. For an in-depth 
analysis of the program see Crawley (1993) and Lavington (2011). 
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US patents.  Although, it is difficult to observe commercialization, we infer to this 
concept in this study by exploiting a particular facet of the US patent system, namely 
switches from Small Entity Status (SES) to Large Entity Status (LES) for renewal fee 
purposes. 
 We find that approximately twelve percent of individual inventors’ patents 
have switched to LES.  In addition, the patent characteristics, such as citations, claims 
and application length, are positively associated with the likelihood of a patent to be 
commercialized to a large corporation.  Furthermore, we discover that the size of the 
inventive team is a positive indicator of commercial potential, a result that coincides 
with Singh and Fleming (2010) who show that patent quality is on average higher 
from research teams’ than single inventors’ efforts. Prior patenting experience is also 
positively related with commercialization. Moreover, patents, where at least one 
inventor has prior corporate ties, have higher probability of being commercialized, a 
result that agrees with findings of Lawson and Sterzi (2013), where they have 
indicated that such patents are of higher quality, approximated by more forward 
citations. All of the above mentioned results are similar across the location of the 
inventor and technology fields. 
 This study contributes to the literature of commercialization of individual 
inventors’ technological advancements by employing patent-level data contrary to the 
vast majority of scholarly work that has relied on primarily survey based evidence. 
For instance, for surveys in the US, see Weick and Eakin (2005) and Wilkins et al 
(2008), in Canada, see Amesse et al (1991) and Dagenais et al (1991), in Sweden, see 
Ejermo and Gabrielsson (2007) and Braunerhjelm and Svensson, (2010) and in Italy, 
see Schettino et al (2013) among others.  To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
uses such an extended dataset of individual inventors’ patents, combining information 
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from several sources and examining patent’s characteristics’ in the propensity of 
transferring patented inventions to the marketplace.  
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes the concept of 
commercialization by individual inventors and how it is approximated.  Section three 
presents the econometric specification and describes how the data is constructed.  
Section four outlines the data and empirical results, whereas the final section 
concludes. 
 
2. Commercialization  
There are two different ways for an individual inventor to achieve 
commercialization.  He can either develop the invention to an end user 
product/service in-house or to license (and/or sell) the invention to a third part, 
usually to an established firm; see Braunerhjelm and Svensson (2010).  The former is 
considered as an internal (direct) while the latter as an external (non-direct) method of 
commercialization; see O' Connor and Hewitt-Dundas (2013). 
 We infer commercialization activity to large corporations from publicly 
available data, based on the following procedure.  In the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) a patent applicant pays renewal fees in order to maintain 
the enforceability of a US patent. Individuals, small business and nonprofit 
organizations are defined as “small entities” in the code of federal register regulation.
3
 
Patents issued to one of those entities have the right to pay SES fees, which are 
approximately half the fees of LES. Transfer of right (such as sale and licensing) to a 
large corporation of a certain patent drives to loss of SES and leads to mandatory 
                                                 
3
 For further information see 37 U.S.C.§1.27 “Definition of small entities and establishing as small 
entity  to permit payment of small entity fees; when a determination  of…loss of entitlement to small 
entity  status are required; fraud on the office.”. 
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payment of LES fees for that particular patent. This switch from SES to LES implies 
commercialization to a large corporation.   
 It should be noted that this method of identifying commercialization does not 
imply that all other patents were not profitable for their owners since there may be a 
group within the set of patents, which never switched to LES, but still were profitable.  
However, our methodology captures the three main outcomes of individual inventors 
commercialization goals, which are either license/sell their patented inventions to a 
large corporation in exchange of large compensations or grow their innovative 
startups to an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or acquisition by a large corporation 
(Meyer, 2005). In other words, we capture the individual inventors’ patents that made 
it ‘big’. 
 The truth is that renewal data has been extensively used to infer the private 
economic value of patents, since the pioneer work of Pakes (1986) and Schankerman 
and Pakes (1986), whereas Bessen (2008) and Liu et al (2008) were the first to 
examine renewal data of US patents.  Furthermore, Bessen (2008) and Rassenfosse & 
van Pottelsberghe (2012) have also explicitly accounted for whether the patent fees 
paid correspond to large or small entity status, but their sole motivation was to infer 
the economic value of patents in money-metric variables and did not focus on 
switches from SES to LES and what that might indicate.   
 
3. Empirical Specification and Data 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
The likelihood of a certain patent switching to LES can be described by a 
probit model defined as follows:   
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Prob(LES = 1|Xi) = Φ(Xiβ)                                   (1.1) 
 
where the endogenous variable LES takes the value 1, if patent i, has paid LES 
fees during its patent life, and 0 otherwise; Φ is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and Xi is a set of covariates defined as:  
 
Xiβ = β0 + β1Citationsi + β2Scopei + β3Inventorsi + β4PastPatExperiencei +  
β5PriorTiesi + β6StateCharacteristicsi + β7GrantYeari + εi 
 
where ε ~ N(0, 1). The set of variables Citationsi for patent i includes the 
variables ForwCitesi, which is the number of patent citations patent i receives by 
2010, the variable BackCitesPati, which is the number of citations patent i makes to 
the patent literature and the variable BackCitesScii, which is the number of citations 
patent i makes to the scientific literature. The set of variables Scopei includes the 
number of claims, Claimsi, the application length, AppLengthi and technology fields 
dummies TechnologyDummyi. For the last variable, each patent i is assigned to a 
broad technology field according to its primary US Classification per Hall et al 
(2001). As there are 37 broad technology fields, the number of technology field 
dummies is 36 to avoid the dummy variable trap.  
 The set of variables Inventorsi capture the collaborations of individuals. 
InventorLowi takes the value of 1 when there is only one inventor in patent i and 0 
otherwise. InventorMedi takes the value of 1, if there are two inventors in patent i and 
0 otherwise. InventorHighi takes the value of 1, if there are more than two inventors in 
patent i and 0 otherwise. As before, to avoid the dummy variable trap, we exclude 
InventorLowi. 
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 The past patenting experience of the inventors of a certain patent is denoted as 
PastPatExperiencei, which is a set of four dummies.  PastPatsNoi takes the value of 
1, if all inventors in the patent have no previous patenting experience and 0 otherwise. 
PastPatsLowi takes the value of 1, if at least one inventor in the patent has previously 
one patent as an inventor and 0 otherwise. PastPatsMedi takes the value of 1, if at 
least one inventor in the patent has between 2 and 9 past patents and 0 otherwise. 
PastPatsHighi takes the value of 1, if at least one inventor in the patent has 10 or 
more past patents and 0 otherwise. PastPatsNoi is not included in the estimation. 
 PriorTiesi is a set of two variables which capture whether the inventor has had 
any patents under a corporation or a university: PastCorpi takes the value of 1, if at 
least one inventor of the patent was an inventor in a previous patent that was owned 
by a corporation and 0 otherwise, whereas PastUnivi takes the value of 1, if at least 
one inventor of the patent was an inventor in a previous patent that was owned by a 
university and 0 otherwise.  
 StateCharacteristicsi is a set of two dummies that control for state 
characteristics: StateHighi takes the value of 1, if the lead inventor of patent i is 
located in a state that has produced the year that patent i was granted more than a 
thousand patents and 0 otherwise and ShareTechStatei is the share of the technology 
field that the patent i belongs to, at the grant year in the specific state and takes values 
between 0 and 100. These two dummy variables are similarly constructed at the 
country level for foreign inventors. GrantYeari is a set of dummies that captures the 
year that patent i was granted. Table 1 includes the definitions of all variables used in 
the present paper. 
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3.2. Data Construction  
Our first source of data is the Patent Data Project, sponsored by the National 
Bureau of Economics Research (NBER), hereafter NBER dataset, in which all patents 
are categorized by assignee type.
4
 The sample of interest includes all patents that are 
assigned to a “US individual” or “Foreign individual” or are unassigned, which means 
that they are owned by the patent inventors, and are issued between 1990 and 2000. 
Overall, we obtain 197,407 inventor-owned patents.  
 From the NBER dataset we obtained directly information concerning the 
dummy variables TechnologyDummy and GrantYear.  In addition, from the same data 
set we constructed the variables ShareTechState, since the location information for 
each patent assignee was available as well as the variable StateHigh, since we were 
able to calculate the number of patents for each state or country per year.  The 
variables ForwCites, BackCitesPat, BackCitesSci, Claims, and AppLength are 
obtained from Lai et al (2011).  More importantly, in this dataset, the authors have 
disambiguated inventor names and have assigned a unique identifier to each inventor.  
Using this information we are able to acquire information for PastPatExperience 
variables. To construct PriorTies we combine information from both NBER and the 
dataset by Lai et al (2011). From the latter, we obtain the inventor’s patenting activity 
and from the former we identify which prior patents were owned by corporations or 
universities.  
 Next, we obtain information about recorded maintenance fee events for the 
above patents from Google Bulk downloads, a dataset maintained weekly by 
USPTO.
5
 The event codes in this dataset enable us to distinguish for these patents 
whether SES or LES fees have been paid. If LES fees have been paid for a patent, we 
                                                 
4
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ 
5
 http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-maintenance-fees.html 
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consider this observation as an indication for successful technology transfer to a large 
corporation. Specifically, according to the Code of Federal Regulations (37 CFR 
§1.27 paragraph a(1)) an individual is entitled in paying SES fees as long as he/she 
has “.... not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed, and is under no obligation under 
contract or law to assign, grant, convey, or license, any rights in the invention”.
6
 Note 
that this regulation applies to each individual patent. Hence, an inventor with more 
than one patent may pay LES fees for some and SES fees for others depending on 
their commercial status.  
 Failure to comply with the above regulations, i.e., not pay LES fees when 
required, will deem the patent invalid and therefore the rate of compliance is likely to 
be very high. On the contrary, while there could be inventors that pay LES fees, even 
though they do not have to do so, this is not very likely, since SES fees are 
approximately half of the LES fees and therefore inventors have significant incentive 
to take advantage of this regulation. Even though there are still cases where there may 
be noise in the data any faulty renewal payments are most likely random and therefore 
will not bias our results.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Before we get into the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile to present some 
interesting aspects of the dataset.  First, as can be seen from Figure 1, the share of 
inventor owned patents issued per year in the US during the period 1990-2000 
remains roughly constant at the range of 15% of the total number of patents.  In 
                                                 
6
 We should note that the regulation further states that an inventor “… who has transferred some rights 
in the invention to one or more parties… can also qualify for small entity status if all the parties who 
have had rights in the invention transferred to them also qualify for small entity status either as a 
person, small business concern, or nonprofit organization”. In other words if an inventor transfers any 
rights or licenses the patent another Small Entity, then the owner can still pay SES fees. 
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addition, the share of inventor owned patents issued per year in the US during the 
same period that switched to LES for renewal purposes ranges from 11% to 13%, as 
can be seen from Figure 2.  Overall, out of 197,407 individual inventors’ patents, 
23,871 (12%) switched their status to LES, as Table 2 depicts.   
 In particular, Table 2 displays the share of patents switching to LES according 
to six major technological fields. Computer patents have the highest likelihood (25%) 
of switching to LES followed by Drugs, Chemicals and Electronics.  Contrary, 
Mechanicals and Other technology fields have the lowest likelihoods of switching to 
LES, even though these technological fields have the highest number of inventor 
owned patents.  Perhaps, one possible explanation for observing this low propensity 
of switching to LES for Mechanicals is the fact that this technological field relies on 
consulting as the main tool for technology transfer (see for example Elfenbein 2007).    
 In addition, Table 2 distinguishes the share of inventor owned patents for each 
technological field according to the location of the inventors by considering two 
groups of patents, i.e., first when all inventors are within the US (domestic) and 
second when all inventors reside outside the US (foreign).
7
 Foreign inventors’ patents 
have higher commercialization rates than domestic inventors on average, i.e., 16.8% 
versus 10.6% respectively.  Given this difference, which seems to be significant, we 
will analyze these two groups separately.  Although, it is not intuitive why this 
difference is observed, perhaps one possible explanation is the fact that some foreign 
inventors are not aware of the SES and LES renewal schemes.
8
 However, this large 
difference cannot be wholly attributed to faulty payments and probably indicates that 
                                                 
7
 We have already excluded from the analysis 1,316 patents for which at least one inventor is within the 
US and at least one is located outside the US. Results for this group are qualitatively similar to the 
results displayed in the paper and therefore excluded from the analysis for brevity. 
8
 For instance, the European Patent Office has only a single payment scheme. 
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foreign inventors’ patents are more likely to be commercialized via a large 
corporation than domestic inventors’ patents.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest 
decomposing by type of inventor and renewal status.  First and foremost we observe 
that ForwCites are higher in the case of patents that switched to LES. This finding is 
consistent with literature which has used forward citations to approximate patent 
quality (see Trajtenberg 1990), private economic value (see Harhoff et al 1999) and 
firm’s market value (see Hall et al 2005). Similar behavior is observed for 
BackCitesPat, BackCitesSci, Claims and AppLength. These variables have also been 
used to approximate patent quality; even though such metrics have been shown to be 
noisy (see Harhoff et al, 2003 and Bessen, 2008). Note that for all the above patent 
metrics, differences between commercialized and non-commercialized patents are 
bigger in the case of domestic than foreign inventors’ patents. This observation could 
support the previous reasoning that a group of foreign inventors may not be aware of 
the renewal schemes and therefore pay LES fees even though they do not have to.  
 Patents that have switched to LES are more likely to have more than two 
inventors as InventorMed and InventorHigh show. For instance 18% of domestic 
inventors’ patents that switch to LES have more than two inventors, while only 3% of 
patents that do not have more than two inventors. Similar results are also obtained 
when examining foreign inventors' patents. These observations are consistent with 
Singh and Fleming (2010) where they found that the more valuable patents are likely 
to be a product of inventor collaboration. With respect to inventor’s previous 
patenting experience, a variable that has been used as a proxy for inventor skill (see 
Conti et al, 2010), we observe that patents that switch to LES are more likely to have 
inventors that have had significant patenting experience. In particular, 68% of 
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domestic inventors’ patents that switch to LES have at least one inventor that has 
more than one prior patent, while the perspective percentage of patents that do not 
switch is only 31%. Similar behavior is observed for foreign inventors’ patents. 
Furthermore, patents that switch to LES are more likely to have inventors that have a 
previous patent under a corporation or under a university. 
 Finally, with respect to the US state or the country profile that the lead 
inventor is located, we examine whether the size and the type of activity are 
associated with the likelihood of switching to LES. For domestic inventors, we 
observe 75% of patents that switch to LES have the lead inventor located in a state 
with more than a thousand patents annually, while 70% of those that do not, whereas 
the difference is considerably bigger when examining countries for the foreign 
inventors’ patents; 74% versus 61% respectively. Further, for patents that switch to 
LES the lead inventor is located in a state that on average has 19% of the patents in 
the same broad technology field as the focal patent; the percentage for patents that do 
not switch to LES is slightly higher at 21%. Overall, we observe that state 
characteristics do not seem to be associated significantly with patents that have 
switched to LES. However, the size of the inventive activity of the country seems to 
make a difference when examining foreign inventors’ patents. 
 
4.2. Probit Results 
 Having examined descriptively all the aforementioned characteristics, the next 
step is to study their relationships simultaneously.  Table 4 reports the results of probit 
estimations that declare marginal effects estimated at the means of the variables for 
domestic inventors’ patents, as shown in Columns 1-3, and for foreign inventors’ 
patents, as shown in Columns 4-6. In particular, from Column 1, which includes all 
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domestic inventors’ patents, we observe that all patent characteristics, such as 
ForwCites, BackCites, BackCitesSci, Claims and AppLength, have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with patents switching to LES. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies that have shown that these metrics can be used as 
proxies for patent value, see for example Harhoff et al (2003) and Bessen (2008).  
 We also observe from the coefficients of InventorMed and InvetorHigh that 
the bigger the group of inventors in a patent the higher the likelihood of a patent 
switching to LES. That means that, keeping all other variables at their means, a patent 
with two inventors is 3.3 percentage units more likely to switch to LES than a patent 
with just one inventor, whereas a patent with more than two inventors is 13.8 
percentage units more likely to switch to LES than a patent with just one inventor. 
This finding is consistent with both Singh and Fleming (2010) and Schettino et al 
(2013) that found that inventors who work in teams produce patents that are of higher 
quality.  
 With respect to past patenting experience, patents with inventors with prior 
experience are more likely to switch to LES, as can be seen from the estimates of the 
coefficients of PastPats variables.  Specifically, patents, where at least one inventor 
has one prior patent, are 3.2 percentage units more likely to switch to LES than 
patents where no inventor has a prior patent. Similarly, patents that at least one 
inventor has two or more than two prior patents are 5.4 and 10.4 percentage units 
respectively to switch to LES than patents where no inventor has a prior patent.  This 
finding is also consistent with the studies of Amesse et al (1991) and Harison & 
Koski (2009) among others. Moreover, patents where the inventor had a patent under 
a corporation are 6.7 percentage units more likely to switch to LES. This finding 
shows that prior corporate ties are important and is consistent with Lawson and Sterzi 
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(2013) where they found that prior corporate ties are associated with patents of higher 
quality as that approximated by more forward citations. We do not find statistical 
significance relationship with inventors that had a patent under a university. 
 Furthermore, patents where their lead inventors are located in highly 
innovative states are more likely to switch to LES than patents which the lead 
inventors are located in less innovative states, even though the difference is virtually 
zero (i.e. 0.6 percentage units difference). With respect to ShareTechState we observe 
that holding all variables at their means, a ten percentage unit increase in 
ShareTechState increases the likelihood of switching to LES by 0.8 percentage units. 
Overall, the aforementioned state characteristics where the lead inventor is located do 
not seem to be substantial.   
 Column 2 of Table 4 excludes patents where their inventors have little to none 
prior patenting experience. In particular, we only consider patents for which at least 
one inventor has strictly more than one patent and the results remain similar to 
Column 1 indicating that the above findings are not driven just by the cases where 
inventors have little to no prior patenting experience. Column 3 checks for the 
robustness of the results for outliers by dropping patents where at least one inventor 
has more than twenty prior past patents. As previously, results remain qualitatively 
similar. 
 Column 4 examines the above relationships in the context of foreign inventors. 
The patent characteristics, as before, are positively associated with the propensity of 
switching to LES. The results with respect to the size of the research team, past 
patenting experience and prior ties, are by and large similar with the results of the 
domestic inventors’ patents. A different result arises when exploring the patenting 
activity of the country that the lead inventors is located. Specifically, a patent for 
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which the lead inventor is located in a country that produces more than a thousand 
patents annually it is five percentage units more likely to switch to LES than a patent 
for which the lead inventor is not located in such an innovative country. This result is 
in contrast with the domestic inventors’ patents where the state’s innovative activity 
did not have a sizeable relationship with commercialization potential and it implies 
that while the location of domestic inventors may play little role in commercialization 
after controlling for other factors, for foreign inventors it is important to be located 
within a country that is highly innovative.  Although, it is difficult, with the data at 
hand, to identify large corporations that acquire or license the patents, the above 
finding denotes that for foreign inventors’ patents, most likely candidates are firms 
within the same country as the lead inventor.   
 To obtain robustness for the previous results we perform similar estimations as 
in the case of foreign inventors’ patents. Column 5 of Table 4 considers only patents 
where at least one inventor has more than one patent while Column 6 excludes patents 
for which at least one inventor has more than twenty patents.  The results remain 
similar as before. 
 Finally, we examine how the aforementioned results vary by technology fields 
without distinguishing domestic versus foreign inventors, since we did not find any 
earmarked differences, and the results of this estimation process are reported in Table 
5.  First of all, ForwCites are positively associated with the propensity of switching to 
LES across all technology fields, as well as other patent characteristics with the 
exception of BackCitesSci which is not significant.  Second, with respect to the size of 
the research team, we observe that a larger group of inventors is associated with 
higher propensity of switching to LES for all technology fields. The smallest 
coefficient is observed in Others and the largest in Chemicals and Computers. In 
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terms of past patenting experience, the positive relationship still holds for all 
technology fields. However, the largest positive relationship is by far in the case of 
Drugs, indicating that past patenting experience is more necessary in this field to 
commercialize an individual inventors’ patent than all other fields. When examining 
prior ties, we observe as before that those patents with inventors that had previous 
patents, under corporate assignees, have higher likelihood of switching to LES 
regardless of technology field. Patents in the Computers technology field with prior 
corporate ties have the highest likelihood of switching to LES. 
 Overall our results show that patent characteristics are important predictors of 
a patent switching to LES. The size of research team and prior experience are 
positively associated with the likelihood of commercialization to large corporations. 
In contrast to prior university patenting experience, prior corporate patenting 
experience is also a positive and significant indicator of successful transfer of a 
patent.  Results are similar for both domestic and foreign inventors as well as across 
different technology fields. Finally, only country level, and not state, innovative 
activity makes a difference when considering the market potential of individual 
inventor’s patent. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Individuals have diachronically contributed in many great inventions. Some 
characteristic examples are: Guglielmo Marconi who invented the radio, Alexander 
Fleming who discovered the famous antibiotic penicillin and Thomas Edison who 
invented the long lasting electric light bulb. As Gorman and Carlson (1990) noted, 
inventors are creative people that succeed in expressing mental ideas tangibly. In fact, 
the contribution of individual inventors’ activity to the overall innovation output has 
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well been documented in the literature. As a result, scholars have examined in depth 
the pathways and determinants of the commercialization of such independent 
inventions. Further, policies in many countries have been set to promote individual 
inventors’ patenting and commercialization activity. 
 This paper considers all individual inventors’ US patents between 1990-2000 
and examines the factors that are associated with commercialization by large 
corporations. In particular, it exploits a peculiarity of the US patent system regarding 
the two different schemes of maintenance fee payments. Patentees are obliged to pay 
renewal fees at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after issuance for each patent to stay in force. 
Individual inventors have the right to pay Small Entity Status fees for a patent they 
own as long they have not transferred, licensed or conveyed any rights of that 
particular patent to a corporation that is concerned as a Large Entity. If they do, then 
they are obligated to pay LES fees for that particular patent. For this reason, we 
employ this observation to infer commercialization activity to large corporations.   
 Our results show that for both domestic and foreign inventors’ patent 
characteristics, including forward citations, are positively associated with the 
likelihood of switching to LES, whereas the likelihood of commercialization also 
increases by the size of the inventive team.  Past patent experience on prior corporate 
ties are also positively associated with the likelihood of switching to LES.  One 
difference that is observed between domestic and foreign inventors’ patents is in the 
inventive activity of the state/country the inventors are located in. In the case of 
domestic inventors’ patents, the state’s inventive activity is not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of commercialization, whereas in the case of foreign 
inventors’ patents, the inventive activity of a country is positively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of switching to LES.  This finding most likely indicates 
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possible cooperation of inventors with firms from the same country.  Lastly, all the 
above results are similar across technology fields with subtle but noteworthy 
differences for past patenting experience and prior corporate ties. 
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Figure 1. Total number of patents and inventor-owned patents per year 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of inventor-owned patents that switch to LES for renewal purposes by grant year 
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Table 1: Definition of the Variables 
VARIABLES Definition 
Citations A set variable including:  ForwCites,  BackCitesPat,  BackCitesSci 
  
ForwCites The number of patent citations patent i receives by 2010 
  
BackCitesPat The number of patent citations patent i makes 
  
BackCitesSci The number of citations to the scientific literature patent i makes 
  
Scope A set variable including:   Claims,  AppLength,  TechnologyDummy 
  
Claims The number of claims 
  
AppLength The application length 
  
TechnologyDummy The technology fields dummies 
  
Inventors A set variable including:    InventorsLow,  InventorsMed,  InventorsHigh 
  
InventorsLow 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is only one inventor in patent i and 
0 otherwise 
  
InventorsMed 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if there aretwo inventor in patent i and 0 
otherwise 
  
InventorsHigh 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if there are more than two inventors in patent i 
and 0 otherwise 
  
PastPatExperience 
A set variable that denotes the past patenting experience of a certain patent's 
inventors including:  PastPatsNo,  PastPatsLow,  PastPatsMed, PastPatsHigh 
  
PastPatsNo 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if all inventors in the patent have no previous 
patenting experience and 0 otherwise 
  
PastPatsLow 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least one inventor in the patent has one 
past patent and 0 otherwise 
  
PastPatsMed 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least one inventor in the patent has 
between 2 and 9 past patents and 0 otherwise 
  
PastPatsHigh 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least one inventor in the patent has 10 or 
more past patents and 0 otherwise 
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PriorTies A set variable including:  PastCorp,  PastUniv 
  
PastCorp 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least on inventor of the patent was an 
inventor in a previous patent that was owned by a corporation and 0 otherwise 
  
PastUniv 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least one inventor of the patent was an 
inventor in a previous patent that was owned by a university and 0 otherwise 
  
StateCharacteristics 
A set variable that controls for state's/country's characteristics including:  
StateHigh,  ShareTechState 
  
StateHigh 
Dummy variable that takes value 1  if the lead  inventor of patent i is located in a 
state/country that has produced the year that patent i was granted more than a 
thousand patents and 0 otherwise 
  
ShareTechState 
The share of the technology field that the patent i belongs to, at the grant year in 
the specific state/country and takes values between 0 and 100 
  
GrantYear A set variable of dummies that captures  the year that patent i was granted 
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Table 2: Allocation of Individual Inventors’ Patents by Technology Field 
 
Total 
Number 
of Patents 
Switch to 
LES 
Switch to 
LES (%) 
Domestic 
Inventors’ 
Patents 
Domestic 
Switch to 
LES 
Switch to 
LES (%) 
Foreign 
Inventors’ 
Patents 
Foreign 
Switch to 
LES 
Switch to 
LES (%) 
Chemical 16,934 3,307 19.53 12,039 2,064 17.14 4,895 1,243 25.39 
Computers 11,984 3,003 25.06 9,495 2,251 23.71 2,489 752 30.21 
Drugs 21,665 4,416 20.38 17,243 3,272 18.98 4,422 1,144 25.87 
Electronics 18,854 3,475 18.43 13,227 2,323 17.56 5,627 1,152 20.47 
Mechanical 45,470 4,304 9.47 33,683 2,629 7.81 11,787 1,675 14.21 
Others 82,500 5,366 6.50 65,000 3,470 5.34 17,500 1,896 10.83 
Observations 197,407 23,871 12.09 150,687 16,009 10.62 46,720 7,862 16.83 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Independent Inventors’ Patents by LES 
 
Domestic Inventors’ Patents 
150,687 
Foreign Inventors’ Patents 
46,720 
  
No LES 
134,678 
LES 
16,009 p-value 
No LES 
38,858 
LES 
7,862 p-value 
ForwCites 7.65 13.93 0.00 6.13 8.24 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.20)  (0.05) (0.17)  
BackCitesPat 9.48 13.11 0.00 6.43 6.93 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.13)  (0.03) (0.08)  
BackCitesSci 0.74 3.08 0.00 0.45 1.50 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.10)  (0.02) (0.07)  
Claims 12.58 17.56 0.00 9.77 12.93 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.12)  (0.04) (0.11)  
AppLength 1.72 2.02 0.00 1.72 2.00 0.00 
  (0.002) (0.01)  (0.003) (0.02)  
InventorsLow 0.81 0.60 0.00 0.84 0.59 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.01)  
InventorsMed 0.15 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.004)  
InventorsHigh 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 
  (0.0005) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.004)  
PastPatsNo 0.56 0.21 0.00 0.59 0.34 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.005)  
PastPatsLow 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.02 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.004)  
PastPatsMed 0.22 0.38 0.00 0.21 0.31 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.01)  
PastPatsHigh 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.005)  
PastCorp 0.18 0.57 0.00 0.15 0.45 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.006)  
PastUniv 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 
  (0.0004) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.003)  
StateHigh 0.70 0.75 0.00 0.61 0.74 0.00 
  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.005)  
ShareTechState 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.63 
  (0.0002) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.001)  
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table 4: Probit Estimations for Domestic and Foreign Inventors’ Patents 
 Domestic Inventors’ Patents Foreign Inventors’ Patents 
VARIABLES All Patents 
No 
Low/Med 
Patents 
No Outliers All Patents 
No 
Low/Med 
Patents 
No Outliers 
       
ForwCites 0.0009*** 0.002*** 0.0008*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (4.85e-05) (0.0001) (4.72e-05) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
BackCitesPat 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (8.62e-05) (0.0002) (8.12e-05) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
BackCitesSci 0.0008*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 0.001*** 0.0007 0.001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Claims 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (6.10e-05) (0.0001) (6.10e-05) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
AppLength 0.0048*** 0.0078*** 0.004*** 0.0180*** 0.0162*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0021) 
InventorsMed 0.0328*** 0.0617*** 0.0331*** 0.0681*** 0.0967*** 0.0668*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0048) (0.0020) (0.0054) (0.0110) (0.0054) 
InventorsHigh 0.138*** 0.239*** 0.126*** 0.191*** 0.257*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0049) (0.0094) (0.0143) (0.0097) 
PastPatsLow 0.0315***  0.0283*** 0.0162***  0.0154*** 
  (0.0027)  (0.0025) (0.0055)  (0.0053) 
PastPatsMed 0.0542***  0.0481*** 0.0287***  0.0276*** 
  (0.0025)  (0.0024) (0.0052)  (0.0051) 
PastPatsHigh 0.104*** 0.0594*** 0.0885*** 0.100*** 0.0875*** 0.0731*** 
  (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0101) 
PastCorp 0.0667*** 0.0957*** 0.0679*** 0.115*** 0.146*** 0.110*** 
  (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0064) (0.0079) (0.0067) 
PastUniv -0.0023 -0.0112* 0.0015 0.0188* 0.0429*** 0.0112 
 (0.0031) (0.0061) (0.0034) (0.0104) (0.0156) (0.0111) 
StateHigh 0.0064*** 0.0116*** 0.0054*** 0.0498*** 0.0658*** 0.0478*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0014) (0.0036) (0.0084) (0.0035) 
ShareTechState 0.0008*** 0.002*** 0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0002 0.00036* 
 (9.29e-05) (0.0002) (9.13e-05) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
       
Observations 150,687 52,786 143,223 46,720 15,176 44,625 
Notes: All columns report probit estimates (marginal effects). In all estimations time variables 
(GrantYear) and technology field dummies (TechnologyDummy) are included but for brevity not reported 
here. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Individual Inventors’ Patents by Technology Field 
VARIABLES Chemicals Computers Drugs Electronics Mechanical Others 
       
ForwCites 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (7.74e-05) 
BackCitesPat 0.0005 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.0008** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
BackCitesSci 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001 -0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Claims 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0007*** 0.00109*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (7.74e-05) 
AppLength 0.0135*** 0.0124*** 0.0165*** 0.0058** 0.0046*** 0.0079*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0009) 
InventorsMed 0.0917*** 0.0975*** 0.0306*** 0.0755*** 0.0333*** 0.0229*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0111) (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0041) (0.0024) 
InventorsHigh 0.265*** 0.269*** 0.177*** 0.240*** 0.139*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0166) (0.0122) (0.0146) (0.0101) (0.0068) 
PastPatsLow 0.0135 -0.0054 0.0355*** 0.0152 0.0260*** 0.0232*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0133) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0047) (0.0029) 
PastPatsMed 0.0353*** 0.0180 0.0768*** 0.0122 0.0465*** 0.0400*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0043) (0.0028) 
PastPatsHigh 0.0727*** 0.0769*** 0.178*** 0.0730*** 0.105*** 0.0803*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0178) (0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0077) (0.0057) 
PastCorp 0.137*** 0.188*** 0.0883*** 0.155*** 0.0579*** 0.0492*** 
  (0.0096) (0.0135) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0046) (0.0033) 
PastUniv -0.0212** 0.0250 -0.0184* 0.0231* 0.0098 0.0090 
 (0.0105) (0.0203) (0.0095) (0.0124) (0.0086) (0.0063) 
StateHigh 0.0236*** 0.0181* -0.0027 0.0306*** 0.0212*** -0.0097*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0102) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0025) (0.0019) 
ShareTechState 0.0028*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** -0.00095*** 0.0025*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
       
Observations 16,934 11,984 21,665 18,854 45,470 82,500 
All columns report probit estimates (marginal effects). In all estimations time variables (GrantYear) and 
technology field dummies (TechnologyDummy) are included but for brevity not reported here. 
Heteroskedastically robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
